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3CORRESPONDENCES is a project linking the pro-
gramme of an International Colloquium [Unknown 
Recipient], held at Casa das Artes, Oporto, with nine 
exhibitions presented in Portugal, Spain, Germany 
and Malta, from 2015 to 2017 > (I) CAAA – Centro para 
os Assuntos da Arte e da Arquitectura | Guimarães; 
(II) Casa das Artes | Oporto; (III) Museu das Comu-
nicações | Lisbon; (IV) Galeria NovaOgiva | Óbidos; 
(V) SALA X | Pontevedra; (VI) Museu de Faro | Faro; 
(VII) Galeria Escudeiros | Beja; and, within the sco-
pe of DGArtes - Portuguese Ministry of Culture inter-
nationalization of the arts funding > (VIII) Rosalux | 
Berlin [31.03 until 21.04.2017] and (IX) Malta Con-
temporary Art | La Valletta [23.06 until 30.07.2017]. 
CORRESPONDENCES is materialised in three 
publications > Red Notebook includes the papers 
presented at the “Unknown Recipient” Internatio-
nal Colloquium > Yellow Notebook covers the exhibi-
tions held in Portugal and Spain > Blue Notebook pre-
sents the exhibitions held in Berlin and La Valletta.
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Artists > Amarante Abramovici | Covadonga Barreiro | 
João Vasco Paiva | Sérgio Leitão | Tânia Dinis
Texts > Alberto Ruiz de Samaniego | Eduarda Neves |
Fernando José Pereira | Monica Coralli and Arthur Vido |
Nuno Faleiro Rodrigues
Aru Kuxipa > Ernesto Neto
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5In a letter excerpt dated June 5 1977, included in 
LA CARTE POSTALE, Jacques Derrida says: “What I like 
most about postcards is that we do not know what is in 
front and what is in back, here or there, near or far, Pla-
to or Socrates, face or reverse. Nor what is more impor-
tant - the image or the text or, within the text, the mes-
sage, the caption or the address.” This fragment is taken 
as a reference for the CORRESPONDENCES project. 
Published in 1980 in France, LA CARTE POST-
ALE falls within the author’s critique of the Western 
philosophical tradition. Despite its markedly intertex-
tual and meta-literary character, this text is, howev-
er, not dissociated from a political stance. As Derrida 
rightly said, without “logoi” (concepts) there is no spe-
cial class of connections that is particularly “logic”. It 
becomes imperative to force language, to break it, to 
disfigure it, to force concepts to say something else.
In this movement against the origin, establishing 
the conditions of its impossibility, we adopt the post-
card as an open letter, with no secrets, no face or re-
verse, a figure operating in speech. 
In the context of the exhibition project, we see 
the postcard as producer of subjectivity, process and 
life experience, itself an agencement of CORRESPON-
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6DENCES. We do not only intend to explore its linguistic, 
grammatical and rhetorical character, but also the use 
value it can acquire when integrated within a chain of 
possible situations. A metaphor for equality, with no 
face or reverse, here or there, image or text, the post-
card exists in this traffic of sent, received, registered, 
circumvented, returned, stolen, lost, anonymous, con-
fidential, inviolable correspondence. Correspondence 
also refers to connection, communication, relation, 
path, journey, route, complementariness, reciprocity. 
Multiple forms, multiple uses. We wish to set ambiva-
lences in motion, to break with directions, departure 
and arrival, beginning and end, artwork and space, 
signified and signifier.   
We still consider, in a Derridean way, that the 
unique right to secrecy is a political right: communi-
cation and its opposite, the Other and the Same, COR-
RESPONDENCES. In a time in which clarity is claimed 
for the sake of communication, where secrecy has no 
place when it is forced to yield to the totalitarianism 
of the public space, to the excess of public confession, 
we claim for incommunicability as a tool of resistance. 
Just as in previous projects, in view of the sin-
gularity of each exhibition space, understood as a 
space of freedom, we wish that both the interpreta-
tive framework and the critical strategy summon 
speculative dialogues and horizons that are more 
symptomatic than ontological. We propose that the 
depth of space be shaped as a surface, be transformed 
into width, as Deleuze said about Lewis Carroll (ex-
plaining the reasons why the writer had changed 
the initial title Alice’s Adventures Under Ground 
71. Gilles DELEUZE – 
Lógica do Sentido. 
São Paulo: Editora 
Perspectiva, 1998, 
p.10.
to Through the Looking-Glass). Thus, Deleuze in-
vites us to rethink the concepts of depth and surface: 
It is no longer about the relationship between 
essence-appearance, model-copy, self-other, for this 
distinction works in the domain of representation. 
Neither the model of the Other, nor the search for the 
origin. 
In CORRESPONDENCES, and following Deleuzian 
thought, we propose that no model resists the vertigo 
of the simulacrum and that there is no possible hierar-
chy. Similarity persists but is produced as an external 
effect of the simulacrum, is built upon the divergent 
series, making them echo. Thus, identity is also pro-
duced as the law that complicates all series, making 
them all return in each one in the course of forced 
movement. 
Experience of difference in itself, which is op-
posed to classic representation. The latter, sustained 
in identity, subjects difference to the principles of iden-
One could say that the old depth having been spread 
out became width. The becoming unlimited is maintained 
entirely within the inverted width. ‘Depth’ is no longer a 
compliment (…) no longer to sink, but to slide the whole 
length in such a way that the old depth no longer exists at 
all, having been reduced to the opposite side of the surface. 
By sliding, one passes to the other side, since the other side 
is nothing but the opposite direction. If there is nothing to 
see behind the curtain, it is because everything is visible, 
or rather all possible science is along the length of the cur-
tain (…) It is not therefore a question of the adventures of 
Alice, but of Alice’s adventure: her climb to the surface, her 
disavowal of false depth and her discovery that everything 
happens at the border1. 
8tity and similarity. Now, this pure difference is the ob-
ject of thought, not of representation. Difference lies 
at the centre of Being itself. The multiple in each one. 
The singular as collective. Being is regularity and be-
coming, actuality and virtuality, difference is its own 
repetition.  
We will follow the wandering, with no beginning 
or end. Chaos without a centre, potency of the simula-
crum.
In these territories, the reasons of History, fili-
ations, classifications, counter-narratives and resist-
ances get muddled. Memory and the writing of History 
will give a body to time. We do not seek modernism’s 
salvation economy, which has been gaining follow-
ers. Those efforts alternate between the Astuteness 
of Reason and the search for the Subject of History. 
If we have never been modern, that illusion is not a 
problem. The ism became irresistible. Like positivism. 
Modernism alternates between the return to an idyllic 
vocation of art (in a kind of second life) and the prag-
matical conception of capital. Hegel’s End of History 
seems to become the drama of contemporaneity. Time 
has become a lifestyle. Western culture, having lost di-
rection, is increasingly trying to catch its own tail. I’m 
out of air, Nietzsche would say. 
Likewise, the dominant ideology according to 
which the economic crisis fuels unique moments for 
reinventing and producing new subjectivation mo-
des, is, for us, only one more tool for reproducing that 
kind of diffuse, apparently virtuous, universal into 
which the discourse around the crisis has become. 
The relationship between the crisis and the prom-
9ise of a better world seems completely aligned with the 
ideological programme that has usually, and over the 
centuries, accompanied the West. The naturalization 
of the crisis in everyday life, its rhetorical and colo-
nizing dimension, expands into the territory of art, 
revealing that it is economic value that continues to 
frame artistic practice and to qualify it as such. In 
claiming for an aesthetic of precariousness, either the 
dynamics of capitalism are reproduced or that claim 
does not always follow the assumptions of a genuine 
artistic programme. On the contrary, it perpetuates 
the capitalist ideology of austerity and its geopolitical 
imperatives.  
CORRESPONDENCES seeks, like a postcard, to 
make discourse live outside any binary form, any la-
belled artistic forms. It is about thinking without a 
precise direction, without defending an absolute Oth-
er, without a nationality. To act like Art, like an Equal. 
It is in that path that we discover ourselves, in 
that journey directed towards an Unknown Recipient. 
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In his book about Nietzsche, Heidegger unex-
pectedly defends Kant over Nietzsche. The question 
revolves around the controversial idea of aesthetic 
disinterest – the Kantian notion of disinterested pleas-
ure that Nietzsche violently attacked, as is known. Ac-
cording to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s reading is mistaken 
since it confuses disinterest with indifference and, fur-
thermore, does not understand the essence of inter-
est. Interest, defends Heidegger, is the desire to appro-
priate, which always implies taking and representing 
the object of interest “with something else in mind”. 
Nietzsche, in turn, does not understand that, on the 
contrary, disinterest consists in letting-be and letting 
happen the object. It would then be about letting the 
object be produced from itself, purely and as itself, in 
its own range and dignity. Kant calls this behaviour 
the “free favour” (die freie Gunst). Through that “free 
favour”, Heidegger says, “we have to let what comes 
our way reach us purely as itself, in its own range and 
dignity. We should not consider it beforehand with 
something else in mind, our aims and purposes”1.  
If we understand him well, then it’s not that 
disinterest withdraws from, or adds to, the object in 
indifference, as Nietzsche thought, but rather that it 
PRESENCE HAS NO SIGN
Alberto Ruiz de Samaniego
1. Heidegger, M., 
Nietzsche, I, Destino, 
Barcelona, 2000, p. 
111.
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would open the possibility of its opposite: the fact of 
one being able to relate essentially to it. Here Heideg-
ger’s words are important because they even give us a 
definition of what he understands by beauty. He says: 
“The misinterpretation of ‘interest’ leads to the erro-
neous opinion that with the exclusion of interest every 
essential relation to the object is suppressed. The op-
posite is the case. Precisely by means of the ‘devoid of 
interest’ [das ohne Interesse], the essential relation to 
the object itself comes into play. The misinterpretation 
fails to see that now for the first time the object comes 
to the fore as pure object, and that such coming for-
ward into appearance is beautiful. The word ‘beautiful’ 
means appearing in the radiance of such coming to the 
fore”2. 
That this is not a trivial matter for Heidegger is 
clear in the sense that in it we touch on the very centre 
of his conception of the work of art, just as the follow-
ing excerpt of his famous “The origin of the work of 
art” shows. He says: “In the work, on the other hand, 
the fact that it is as such a thing, is what is unusual 
[das Ungewöhnliche]. The happening of its created-
ness does not simply reverberate through the work; 
rather, the work casts before itself the eventful fact 
[Ereignis] that, as a work, this work is, and exhibits 
this fact constantly.   
The more essentially the work opens itself, the 
more luminous [leuchtend] becomes the uniqueness 
of the fact that it is rather than is not. The more es-
sentially this thrust comes into the open, the stranger 
[befremdlich] and more solitary the work becomes. In 
the bringing forth [Hervorbringen] of the work there 2. Ibid.
12
lies the offering forth of the “that it is”. 
The more solitary the work, fixed in the figure 
[festgestellt in die Gestalt], stands within itself, the 
more purely it seems to severe all ties to human be-
ings, then the more simply does the thrust that such 
a work is step into the open, and the more essentially 
the extraordinary [das Ungeheuere] is thrust to the 
surface and the long-familiar thrust down.”3
For Heidegger, beauty would be this thrusting to 
the surface, the evidence or presence of the thrust al-
lowing something to be, to be fully. It is not possible 
to analyse here in detail the extremely rich semantic 
field Heidegger left us: to become luminous or step into 
the open, isolation and strangeness of the work in its 
solitude, fixing in the figure, the thrust of the extraor-
dinary, etc. We will be content with the idea that, by 
placing ourselves within the radius from where the 
work is thrust, a radius that would delimit what we 
understand as beauty, our usual relations with the 
world will change. In fact, as is known, Heidegger be-
lieves that it is in that disposition that one would be 
able to “restrain [ansichhalten] all usual doing and 
prizing, knowing and looking, in order to dwell within 
the truth that is happening in the work”.4    
Therefore, if we follow Heidegger, what is char-
acteristic of aesthetic behaviour – although not in the 
somewhat pejorative sense in which he understood 
the term – would be to present or make present an art-
work, but in an essential, absolute way (and here, un-
fortunately, we cannot stop to look at the influence of 
its isolation and solitude, its being fixed in the figure, 
3. Heidegger, M., “El 
origen de la obra de 
arte”, in Caminos de 
bosque, Alianza, Ma-
drid, 1998, pp. 47-48.
4. Ibid., p. 33.
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like the philosopher said). However, and this is very 
important, the presentation of the work is done to a 
previously existing one that opens up in it and with it. 
And, therefore, is also presented, is made present in 
an essential, absolute way. It also happens, so to speak. 
In this way, each work puts us in the presence of 
the unique. A uniqueness that, in fact, does not follow 
any previous pattern, is no more than a sign of itself 
and cannot be repeated. Art, said Paul Klee, “gives no 
example”. 
The artwork thus brings these two together; 
these two instances – subject and object –, in this 
sense, always unpredictable, always singular, unique. 
Bataille, a reader of Heidegger, said it his own way: 
“The endless carnival of artworks is there to show that 
a triumph (…) is promised to anyone who leaps into 
the irresolution of the instant”5. That leap can only be 
an anguished one, since what happens there is thrust 
to the surface devoid of any familiarity, strange and 
retracted from us.  
All this leads us to somewhat disturbing pro-
posals. For example: there never is, nor can there be, 
acquired experience neither in the artist nor in the 
artwork visitor, in the sense that, let us say it with 
Derridean words, each time the work is unique, the be-
ginning and end of a world in time. It gives itself in the 
form of a clarification, a presenting of presence itself 
as insigne6 truth. By insigne we want to allude, for ex-
ample, to an extreme until now not known or measur-
able in any way. Not signed: insigne. The work is there: 
fixed in the figure, absolute, absolved, the ties or bonds 
with human beings severed, with which humans try to
5. Cit. by Jean-Luc 
Nancy, in Un pensa-
miento finito, Anthro-
pos, Barcelona, 2002, 
p. 67.
6. T. N. In the name 
of precision and in 
view of the lack of a 
word in English that 
will convey the double 
meaning of insigne 
(“distinguished” but 
also “not signed”, i.e. 
“not bearing a sign”), 
the Spanish was 
retained in the text in 
italics. 
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make it familiar, to tame it or dominate it.     
On the other hand, that the work is only a sign 
of itself also means that the work of art is no longer, 
as Hegel wanted, the sensitive realization of an idea. 
But rather: donation, presence making itself: event: 
Ereignis. It is, in fact, the opening up: it opens in itself 
and to itself. For the open is no more than the place of 
meaning and, from this point of view, meaning threat-
ens to be an infinite transparency. Where it leads to, to 
what thrust to the surface of meaning, is the problem; 
in the sense that this transparency can well be mean-
ing spilling into an unarrestable difference/différance. 
As if, again with Derrida, we would prove that with 
this happening what actually takes place is an infinite 
retreat of meaning, a retreat, however, through which 
each existence exists, precisely.      
So nothing can be decided beforehand concern-
ing this exercise – that should be infinite – of appropri-
ating a meaning; there where it is about the movement 
of a thought and of the gestures – to a large extent se-
cret and unknown even to oneself – of its decision. For 
this very reason, thought in its decision is not that 
which undertakes to found being and to found itself 
with it, but rather and only the decision that ventures 
– in which it ventures – and that affirms the existence 
about its own absence of foundation. Existence, in the 
end, has no essence. Essence is found here, in the possi-
bility that is each time adventurous, each time unique 
and possible in its extreme singularity for thought.  
In any case, this relationship also determines 
that its receiver continues open – dwells in the dwell-
ing – to its opening. The opening is, surely, nothing. It 
15
is the being-open of being, or, furthermore: its being 
suspended, to come. However, in suspension, by defi-
nition, the decision escapes, does not take place, can 
never take place. In fact, the activity and authority 
implied by the decision are closely linked to the pas-
siveness and abandon of the opening. All this in the 
sense that the decision will fade away to the benefit of 
the Ereignis, the happening. Moreover, if existence is 
this being open to being as a suspended opening, we 
will be able to conclude the lack of basis, the absence 
of ground, of a foundation or of reason, upon which we 
can continue existing. From it we can only conclude 
the following: our continuing in existence lacks, all in 
all, stability, consistency and security and we would 
even say that the process of that opening cannot clear-
ly be a self-opening but only an onto-opening.      
Therefore, in both cases, work and subject, there 
are no preconditions. This is why the event is insig-
ne. Henri Maldiney said: “Insigne is what carries in 
it its distinctive sign. Not conferred by any other. It 
is through this distinctive sign that the sensitive ac-
quires meaning, carrying itself to a level of excellence 
that it inaugurates.”7 What counts here, then, is what 
does not lend itself to univocality, or for that matter to 
plurivocality, but that makes the same load of meaning 
waver, permanently bringing it into crisis, into ques-
tion, into unbalance. It is not by chance that Heideg-
ger, speaking of the setting to work of truth through 
art, calls it something like “the essential sacrifice”, as 
one of the forms of this setting to work concentrates 
on art. Elsewhere in that same text on the origin of the 
work of art, he had deemed it necessary to count “the 
7. Maldiney, H., “Ori-
ginariedad de la obra 
de arte”, El arte no es 
la política. La política 
no es el arte, Ed. Bru-
maria, Madrid, 2015, 
p. 380.
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gifts and sacrifices” at the core of the being open to the 
clarification of being.  
There is something sinister about all this, as 
probably already noticed. Something that links the 
sinister, Heidegger’s extraordinary - or the inhospi-
table – with Freud and Schelling: das Un-heimlich. It 
is important here to recall how the Kantian sublime 
was produced in a “sacrifice” of the imagination that 
“plunges into itself and, by doing so, is submerged into 
a moving satisfaction”8. And how the program of mod-
ern poetry is, so to say, presented in a note by Novalis 
for Enrique de Ofterdingen: “Dissolution of a poet in 
his song – he will be sacrificed among savages”. Where 
we see that the sublime is the offering, including as the 
destiny of the art of our time. To round off with this, 
let us say with Bataille: “Poetry (…) is the sacrifice in 
which words are victims (…). Neither can we do with-
out the efficacious relations words introduce between 
men and things. But we tear words from these links in 
a delirium”9.     
Art would thus be the ecstatic opening of the sen-
sitive. Not of the immediate or formed or familiarized 
sensitive – this would be the mere world, if we are al-
lowed this negligent expression, bearing in mind that 
we only know what we have assigned a meaning to –, 
but of the sensitive in its putting itself to truth, in its 
essential disclosing. But this is, of course, what cannot 
be decreed beforehand by the artist, in the form of a 
prior decision, or of a performative declaration, char-
acteristic, for example, of the work of a conceptual: 
this is art. The opening, in fact, is not the result of any 
decree. Here is the trivial – and, deep down, sterile – 
8. Crítica del juicio, 
Consideraciones 
generales sobre la ex-
posición de los juicios 
estéticos reflexivos, 
y &26.
9. Cit. por Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Un pensa-
miento finito, Anthro-
pos, Barcelona, 2002, 
p. 67.
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tautology in which conceptual art moves: a work of art 
is what makes an artist, and: what makes an artist is 
a work of art.   
All this becomes problematic in the sense that, 
if the work is not a delegation of anything, not even a 
sign, whatever it may be, but only the installation for 
the happening of being, in the precise and unique form 
of its being-work, of its insigne sensitive dimension, 
then it is also not possible to judge it. Since to judge it 
would be to separate it, as from outside its own dona-
tion – the donation or presence that it is and summons 
– from this donation of its. It would be like elevating 
above it to qualify it, evaluate it, measure it or judge it 
from norms that in fact do not belong to it. As we have 
said: the work is in its opening and only in it, therefore 
it has no more norm than that which it establishes, 
each time unique. Each work is in itself the genesis of 
its own norm. It is, hence, in the first and last instance, 
that which decides its being-work. Not the viewer, not 
the artist. The existence of the work becomes, in this 
way, transcendent. Its existence transcends the power 
of its author, not only that of the receiver.      
Let us return to Maldiney: “According to concep-
tual art, the idea of art is the immanent cause of works. 
‘It’s art!’: the artist proclaims and at the same time 
records the presence, in a work, of art itself… because 
it decides so by pronouncing it in it. It’s an ontologi-
cal pronouncement that decrees the identity between 
the idea of art and art itself. That said, to be precise, a 
work is not a work of art if it does not attack that con-
fused identity as a falsehood, just as the opposite state-
ment, which identifies art as the cultural promotion of
18
a certain trendy production.”10
The work is isolated, sovereignly isolated, we can 
now state, considering what we have seen until here. 
That the work is isolated is very closely linked to this 
aspect we have just commented on, even if this is not 
very apparent. The work is always isolated, it gleams 
in its solitude, because it is the palpable evidence, the 
patency – more than the demonstration – that it estab-
lishes its own, unprecedented, unique norm and that, 
in its thrust to the surface, shows precisely the differ-
ence between knowing how to produce a work – the 
art, we would say, of producing an artistic object – and 
the being work of a work of art. Art is immanent by be-
ing the product of the work, its event. It does not rest 
upon any other prior or higher, ideal or empirical, real-
ity. That is why the work is the continuous happening 
of its opening, a ceaseless origin and offering. Werk ist 
Weg: work is way, said Paul Klee.      
All this, we say, is problematic. Since, if so, if the 
work is clearly not a translation of an ideal scheme 
or model, but determines the dimension according to 
which it is formed, then an artwork is incomparable. 
Its norm is only valid and operational with regard to 
itself. Therefore, not only is the work not the image of 
anything but, inclusively, and in it lies the extraordi-
nariness it incorporates, it doesn’t even offer the im-
age of itself. Which is why we have to dwell in it, listen 
to it and inhabit it time and again. Each time offering 
us a perhaps different possibility, each time being 
unique, the work and us in that instant of our mutual 
co-happening. This is the event: the event of an appro-
priation each time singular and each time modalized
10. Maldiney,  cit.., p. 
388.
19
in a singular way. 
In closing, we deal with drawing near the su-
preme moment that marks the autogenetic process of 
the work and the apertural instant of an us in it. This 
requires a leap into the irresolution of the instant that 
Bataille spoke of. An instant in which one decides in 
the anguish and joy of existing as if without a foun-
dation, not expecting anything in return. A decision, 
however, or a being decided that are not, cannot be, 
neither attributes nor actions of the existing subject, 
except that in which, to start with, existence is made 
existence, opens up to its own being. And all that with-
out an aesthetic judgment, which would be like want-
ing to regulate – a posteriori – an event, a presence, an 
existence. Art is not an object of representation, but 
precisely that: an existence. It is not something mere-
ly put in sight, disclosed, but something that allows to 
see and to be. A form of presence, and presence has no 
sign.   
That is why in this relationship established by 
the work of art we can also cipher the absolute sov-
ereign of all relations. For example, that between sub-
ject and object. This is a relation in which none of the 
participants previously exist. None of them is given 
beforehand, expected, predetermined: signed. Subject 
and object are completely, portentously made unfa-
miliar in that unprecedented relation. A relationship, 
furthermore, whose time is uncertain and clearly not 
assignable but that, on the other hand, if we wish, is 
of the utmost intensity. A face-to-face relationship, we 
could say; a full relationship. In which both sides give 
themselves to each other, opening up truly and totally. 
20
Now, here, there, the subject will divest himself 
of any and all intentionality, of all intention of subjec-
tivity. His behaviour will be limited to, if possible, to be 
or try to be in the disposition, in the spacing and instal-
lation that the object, the work, makes available. And 
the work is, in turn, will be, in its strict sense, object, 
full: presence, made present in its splendour. Hence, 
there can be no judgment, but rather a coming togeth-
er. The work puts two beings face-to-face and alone.      
It is in that sense also that the relationship es-
tablished by the work can be defined, again, as being 
sinister: through it I lose myself to the world, I cease 
to be me, I no longer have marks or territories. As in 
an act of magic, I was deprived of native soil, of heim, 
of a home, of a family. I entered the domain of its alter-
ity. I was torn from my knowledge and my power. In 
the same way that, we could conclude, the work used, 
utilized, helped itself of the instrumental knowledge 
and power of the artist, in order to elevate him above 
himself up until his opening path.  
In any case, the work seems to exist, escaping 
any authority. Ereignis: event. Happening. Happening 
of a presence that now co-belongs to us and to which we 
co-belong. Having disappeared as projects of the world 
and the world itself as something to be projected. Dis-
appearance in the open that, in time and through it, 
opens up in us. That work reveals us in a dimension 
in which we did not know ourselves, we do not know 
ourselves. Exposed to ourselves in it, then we exist. 
We are likely to be at a level of ourselves of which a 
priori we knew nothing and whose revelation shares 
the age and origin with the work. All the potential of 
21
our existence therefore implies, opens up and inter-
sects through the work of art. There, during that time, 
that duration, we recognised ourselves strangely, very 
strangely. We recognised ourselves as something that 
is not the same as ourselves but, we will say it a bit in 
Lacan’s way, is perhaps more me than myself, displac-
ing ourselves: opening a schist: extimacy.
22
1.
We know, since Marx, that capitalism holds the 
supreme temptation of total expansion. We are faced 
with it in our contemporaneity. However, if we turn to 
Godel, we also know that that very system necessarily 
goes into crisis for lack of exteriority. We live with the 
latter. 
This kind of inevitability is materialised accord-
ing to a deterministic order of space occupation: that 
conveyed by the entire paraphernalia of seduction 
phenomena, today improved into surprising perfor-
mance levels.  
Psychoanalytic theory calls those empty signifi-
ers asserting a place of attraction nodal points. A par-
ticular type of signifier that, in view of its emptying, is 
THE TRAP OF LIGHT
Fernando José Pereira
“At a formal dinner once a professor of some science 
or other, wanting to make small talk, had pointed out a few 
insects gyrating above the candelabra. He had told her that 
it was the visual impression of an even deeper darkness 
beyond the light that drew them in. Even though they might 
be eaten, they had to obey the instinct that made them seek 
out the darkest place, on the far side of the light - and in this 
case it was an illusion.”
Ian McEwan
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forged as an approach to an abstraction – in the same 
way that gold, although being a particular value in use, 
also takes on the condition of representing the notion 
of value in general: that which tries to contain in itself 
the significant absence of a totality, i.e. a hegemonic 
place. 
However, a place can only be materialised if its 
limits are named and these truly state the essence of 
empty signifiers. 
Limits only exist when differences are active-
ly established. However, on the other hand, interior 
and exterior are first and foremost structured, they 
too, according to sets of differential identities, which 
is why it is impossible to establish a set of differences 
that constitutes internality and externality. Defining 
the limit can only happen, then, according to anoth-
er perspective: that which clearly assumes the notion 
of antagonism. Real limits can never be neutral. They 
always imply the idea of exclusion, i.e. a signifier that 
completely cancels all difference.  
Thus, we are faced with an apparent paradox: 
a system’s conditions of possibility are also the con-
ditions of its impossibility. This is quite an important 
realization since all the desiring constructions derive 
from it.
The hegemonic place exudes seduction, hence 
the impossible neutrality of limits but also the ample 
power of propagation. A brightness so strong that it 
turns into blindness. An impossibility to see that re-
sizes the exclusion towards a desiring power, which 
aspires, above all, to meet the real, though this is obvi-
ously impossible. 
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The symbolic loading of constructed reality – 
that which is possible – determines all the possible 
combinations for linking up an aim, whether in skilful 
semantic constructions of an impossible dualized map-
ping, or in complex networks of interdependence that 
attempt to materialise the possibility of impossibility, 
i.e. the utopia of visibility on the far side of blindness. 
Before such a state of compulsive centralisation 
(based, however, on the notion of difference!), it might 
be possible to metaphorically express a possibility of 
chaotic ordering – the strange attractor – as catalys-
ing what Deleuze termed diagrammatic reality, that is, 
smooth space within the striated. This attractor never 
takes the shape of a point. Instead, it materialises in a 
set of lines entangled in one another and inside a circle 
distorted anamorphically.  
The most interesting aspect of this formal peculi-
arity is expressed in the possibility of the apparent im-
possibility – vision after blindness – through the 360º 
sight range. The nodal point always asserts its exist-
ence through the seductive character it exudes. Its 
lure determines the exclusion of anamorphic vision, 
which naturally makes the correct understanding of 
contemporary spatiality more difficult. In his seminal 
essay on the cultural logic of late capitalism, Fredric 
Jameson refers, by way of conclusion:   
“The new political art (if it is possible at all) will 
have to hold to the truth of postmodernism, that is 
to say, to its fundamental object – the world space of 
multinational capital – at the same time at which it 
achieves a breakthrough to some as yet unimaginable 
new mode of representing this last, in which we may 
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again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and 
collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and 
struggle which is at present neutralized by our spatial 
as well as our social confusion. The political form of 
postmodernism, if there ever is any, will have as its 
vocation the invention and projection of a global cog-
nitive mapping, on a social as well as a spatial scale.”  
2.
From the mid-1990s, my work as an artist has 
tried to embody my concerns with issues around ref-
ugee flows, which have always existed and today are 
reaching yet one more peak of intensity. 
The main point, here too, is the formalization of 
things in terms of artistic practices. Many dangers 
threaten the label of “political art”, which I have al-
ways refused, though they also threaten its opposite: 
the hermitism of some practices covered in such ambi-
guity that they no longer make sense, whatever sense 
we may want to assign them. Aware of these problems, 
over the last twenty years I have made many artworks 
that more or less explicitly deal with this issue. Above 
all, at a time like the one we are living today, this prac-
tice gives me the confidence to be able to look back and 
say things without giving in to the “opportunism” of 
trendy or contemporary topics. 
The trap of light mentioned in the title is a met-
aphor born out of reading a novel by Ian McEwan and 
served as the motto for an exhibition held in 2002 
where, among other works, I exhibited a large-format 
photograph with a black background and a strong 
light at its centre. A planet? The moon? A lamp? Any 
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of these but, above all, the metaphor for the illusory 
relationship that the “light” emitted from Europe pro-
duces in its neighbouring peoples. In his 1979 book, 
“Cybernetics of Cybernetics”, Heinz von Foerster al-
ready said, regarding the relationship humankind was 
beginning to establish with the new digital technolo-
gies, “we do not see that we have a blind spot. In other 
words, we do not see that we do not see.”, in a power-
ful allusion to the necessary discernment before the 
dazzle massively produced in us by digital technology. 
The same might then be said of the waves of migrants 
and refugees. The huge illusion and dazzle is one of the 
only plausible reasons for their quest for the right to a 
better life, which is however quickly thwarted at their 
arrival to the “old continent”. The friendly side of the 
reception is also pure illusion. In 1998 I made a video 
installation that stood out because of the simplicity of 
the images it presented: an iron gate continually open-
ing and closing, accompanied by the powerful sound of 
its metal hitting the metal of the square. A small detail 
made all the difference. It was a right-angled double 
projection where one of the images was slowed down 
a few frames in relation to the other. The rhythm of 
both gates opening was temporally changed by the 
mismatch in the time of each film, creating a change 
in the viewer’s relationship with the piece: at some 
point, every time one of the gates was opened, the oth-
er would immediately close until there came a time 
when it was absolutely impossible to go in. Every now 
and then, the images of both projections would darken 
and a geographic coordinate would appear. It was the 
coordinate of the Tarifa beach in the south of Spain, a 
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favoured place for the arrival of migrants and refugees 
and, as such, intensely patrolled. Nothing was said, 
however. As Jacques Derrida stated, the interactivity 
that matters is the deferred one. In this way, those in-
terested could later find out what place it was: if they 
searched in a deferred way. Besides this, a computer 
placed in front of the projections allowed the viewer to 
play a popular game at the time: Tetris. Here the play-
er was asked to build a wall until the limit of the image. 
The player building the highest wall would win…      
And, however, the walls became increasingly in-
visible but stronger and more difficult to climb over. In 
2005, an invitation for an exhibition in Rua de Ceuta 
in Porto, allowed me, once again, to take this subject 
as the starting point for my work. As is known, Ceuta 
is the place where almost all African migrants trying 
to get to Europe converge. An installation titled “ap-
parently nothing is going on” sought to question the 
way in which the means of border control began to be 
dematerialised so as to be much more effective. On 
one hand, the almost romantic naivety of wanting to 
cross the strait in the Mediterranean at night to de-
cisively take advantage of its darkness; on the other, 
a new technology coldly perfecting the technical ca-
pacities to detect heat or, said more clearly, a number 
of infrared cameras placed on high aerial towers and 
turned to the sea in order to map the entire surface, in 
an invisible – cowardly? – way and, like this, know the 
exact number of people crossing the sea. Apparently 
nothing is going on and, however, all the surveillance 
systems are fully functioning with one interest alone: 
to arrest people.   
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The possibility of building a feasible reality for 
all requires an adjustment with the idea of impossibil-
ity. The Derridean notion of im-possibility transforms 
the negativity of the notion into another possibility, 
now with a positive sign. It is that im-possibility that 
is in direct confrontation with the constant, exponen-
tial migrations of the last years, of refugees and mi-
grants seeking a better life or simply to escape death. 
Some years ago I made a video installation from 
a description given by a Beirut inhabitant of the Israe-
li bombings while these were taking place. In it, con-
stant running was interrupted by the sound of sirens 
announcing the imminent bombings. In the words of 
the anonymous Beirut inhabitant, he was a kind of 
infinitude temporally lying between the signal emit-
ted by the sirens announcing the air strikes and the 
echo caused by the explosion of bombs. It was, in his 
words, a void that seemed unbearable. The video was 
called “suspended time”. The im-possibility refers to 
this suspended time. To a new positive possibility to 
press ahead. Even if that implies that all naiveties – 
and, why not, utopias – surface in an attempt to em-
body the exit.    
And, however, we know well where the materi-
alised impositions of utopias led us and we know even 
better what was gradually passed down to us by the 
Reason reigning in Europe ever since Enlightenment 
– the trap of light, again – up until our days. A Span-
ish philosopher, who unfortunately died too soon, Luis 
Castro Nogueira, formulated a notion of the utmost in-
terest: why are utopias always of Reason and never of 
reasons? Everything changes with this new proposi-
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tion. For the better. To understand utopia outside the 
realm of Reason and to direct it towards reasons is a 
crucial change to grasp the apparently near-suicidal 
movements of refugees. This is no longer a grand ac-
complishment but rather a desiring gesture. An action 
that, in a way and abusively, we will also be able to in-
tegrate into artistic practice. At least into that which, 
as a matter of principle, does not want to be framed 
within the spiral of trade and consumerism into which 
its mainstream – if we want, its light – has become. A 
light that knows how to set its traps perfectly…
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The history of a place very often includes inten-
tional added parts and inaccuracies. These ‘inven-
tions’ have in general and above all the purpose of 
adding value to the origins of a people, of a group, of a 
family and consequently of the place that offers them 
shelter. The identity construction starts from this nar-
rative, made up of fragments of true history, enriched 
with ‘pieces’ borrowed from legends or from the imagi-
nation of the individuals in charge of passing them on. 
Oral tradition makes any changes in this assemblage 
easier and conveys a certain flexibility to the narra-
tive. It happens that this narrative, which includes 
signifying symbols at the time of its drafting, loses its 
meaning later on, becoming sometimes obscure and 
difficult to interpret. The process it generates opens in 
turn way to new versions.
In general, the potentialities of a place form the 
basis of credibility upon which oral history stands, in 
order to appear plausible. The geographical situation, 
favorable to human settlement and strategic for com-
merce, and the wealth of available resources are, in 
particular, elements which contribute to its elabora-
tion. Author names are given when they are author-
itative or add to the glorification of the people and of 
THE TOFFINU AND THE LEBU: halfway 
between indigenous narrative and spatial 
resistance
Monica Coralli and Arthur Vido
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the place, but mostly they remain unknown: reflection 
of a collective appropriation, history becomes shared 
memory. This shared memory includes, however, dif-
ferent versions which appeared at unclear times, but 
preserves some invariables, a sort of landmarks and 
their frequency enables you to recognize the global 
permanence of history. This way, the least credible 
versions will continue to be told but more like anec-
dotes. To appeal to the identity linked to a territory 
seems pertinent from the moment a narrative will 
have permitted to establish common references which 
make sense to a specific community and create a uni-
fying consensus amongst its members. This is the case 
with Toffinu and Lebu groups.
The two communities we propose to study have 
formulated similar narratives in spite of the distance 
separating them (several thousand kilometers), the 
linguistic differences (Toffinu speak Toffingbè, Lebu 
speak Wolof) and their ways of building and inhabit-
ing their dwellings so as to legitimize their presence in 
a given place and maintain their supremacy thereon. 
The narrative each of the two communities has elab-
orated has gained ground by acquiring force of truth 
and its own legitimacy. In this way, the originality 
and the challenge of this subject of research lie, in our 
opinion, in the new approximation of the two peoples 
and of their respective histories, as well as in the iden-
tification of the ties that sustain «the words and the 
things» (Foucault, 1966), that is to say the narratives 
and the spatial forms they build and inhabit.
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1. In order to decrypt 
these transforma-
tions, our approach 
will follow afterwards 
with a retrospective, 
exhaustive study of 
the different living 
patterns which will 
complement our data.
Our interest in a comparative study of the Lebu 
and Toffinu groups derives primarily from the con-
struction of the narrative of their origins. In both cas-
es, an artifice arisen from the slow transformation of 
true history has partially erased their warrior and 
nomadic past in order to value their fishing activities 
and, in general, their relation with water and their rel-
atively sedentary character. Their present image has 
hidden away their traces: nowadays they are consid-
ered «natives», «indigenous» from the territories they 
occupy and regard themselves as rural proprietors. 
Also, when considering the etymology of their respec-
tive names, their naming does not give an account of 
their history.
The common, identifiable elements between the 
two communities, namely in the causes for their with-
drawal, and then retreat to water territories, do not 
make it easy to decrypt the reasons for their different 
destinies. In our study, combining the historical and 
the socio-anthropological approaches, we will ques-
tion certain architectural forms and specific choices in 
terms of materials in order to explain the reasons for 
their evolutions which, in their essential, are the work 
of their dwellers.1
This research is just beginning. We are present-
ing here the first results, which are still provisional.
In Senegal, field work started in 2015, at the time 
an urban project workshop on social housing was tak-
ing place. In fact, reflecting on this subject in Africa, 
in Dakar in particular, and on the meticulous observa-
tion of the transformations operated by its inhabitants 
33
2. Reference is made 
to the programs 
launched during ’50s 
for the building of 
social lodgings in the 
Cap-Vert peninsula 
between 1950 and 
1980.
3. The internatio-
nal workshops in 
Dakar are organized 
within the frame of 
the ENSA Paris La 
Villette’s Master 1 
urban project course, 
«Détour(s). L’infraor-
dinaire des métropo-
les », coordinated by 
Olivier Boucheron.
4. The Aguégués are 
group of lands situa-
ted above water level, 
that are partially 
flooded, situated in 
the vicinity of Porto-
-Novo. The inhabiting 
communities live 
both on the river-lake 
lagoon waters and 
on the Oueme delta 
lands, as their acti-
vities are rhythmed 
by the rise and fall of 
water levels.
during half a century in the dwellings2 they benefi-
ciary, has led us to look into ‘traditional’ forms of hous-
ing. Maybe they would probably make us understand 
better the transformations in more recent housing, of 
modernist influence, proposing a new life pattern, di-
ametrically opposed to the lifestyles characteristic to 
the majority of the population.3 In Benin, the elements 
presented here are based on secondary sources, rela-
tively dated, except for one work, yet unpublished, the 
result of a study conducted between 2011 and 2012 by 
the archeologist Orazio Patti on the Aguégués.4
TWO NARRATIVES, SEVERAL RECURRENCES
The different founding narratives on the rooting 
feeling of the Toffinu as Lebu, contribute to explain the 
links between past and present and allow us to under-
stand the reasons for maintaining a certain form of 
housing and of inhabiting, as well as their own trans-
formation, in spite of the advance of the real estate 
development. Our purpose will be to intersect these 
narratives with the specific and evolving spatial forms 
they produce. Their housing is, in our opinion, a re-
markable example of resistance to globalizing forms 
of urbanization.
Resisting
This capacity to resist is, in our opinion, the 
proof that the Lebu have a strong identity linked to a 
given territory, through a narrative built to proclaim 
and reinforce their presence which continues to be in-
fluenced by external factors, by political and econom-
ic games of investors and by international partners, 
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5. This choice to 
live on marshlands, 
halfway between land 
and water, according 
to seasons, led O. Patti 
to create a neologism 
to refer to them. The 
term terreaux (lan-
dwaters) precisely 
indicates this adap-
tation of their lives 
and of their activities 
following the seasonal 
periods of the year.
6. We will not be able 
to develop here the 
different entities that 
organize the Lebu 
Republics.
7. This expression is 
very often used by all 
those interested in 
village manufacturing 
putting in the first 
place the creative 
dimension of the 
dwellers. We refer to, 
among others, the 
works of Pedrazzi-
ni, Bolay, Bassand 
(1996), Dorier-
-Apprill, Gervais-Lam-
bony (2007), Paquot 
(2010).
imposing attitudes different from those pertaining to 
their culture. The Toffinu living on the shores of Lake 
Nokoué in Benin, in a territory situated between Co-
tonou and Porto-Novo, and the Lebu from Cap-Vert 
peninsula in Senegal have developed specific forms 
of resistance that have more to do with spatial and 
material form related to a specific location near wa-
ter, inside water or between land and water5. With the 
Lebu, this is also combined with a very structured so-
cio-political, religious organization.6 «The contact with 
the Europeans [tells us Bourgoignie about the Toffinu, 
author’s note], could have made them parachute in an 
intoxicating world and history made of the commerce 
of guns and mirrors, of precious fabrics, of multifiori 
(pearls in Venetian molten glass), and of alcohol which 
might have put an end to a development in autonomy.» 
The Lebu have traded with the Europeans and made 
their permanence possible on the peninsula but, in 
fact, both the Toffinu and Lebu knew how to preserve 
their autonomy and, even today, any decision pertain-
ing to land cannot be taken without their consent; in 
this sense, they continue to be the «town makers»7. 
Building nativeness
The ‘Building’ of the autonomy has made essen-
tial, in both cases, a first oblivion to hide the fact that 
they have not been the first dwellers on the sites they 
occupy at present. In fact, we know that they have 
settled in successive migrant flows which explains, 
among other things, their persistent ties to the land, 
when they call themselves «water people», following 
the etymology of their naming. In the social construc-
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tion of their communities, collective memory volun-
tarily detaches itself from real history in order to re-
tain only the elements around which history left for 
posterity is then forged. Strictly speaking, there is no 
founding myth. 
Three points seem to us essential in their com-
parison: 
The first point is that in both cases they are flee-
ing warriors coming from the inland and forced to set-
tle down on the shores (of rivers, of lagoons or of the 
sea). The second point has to do with the close rela-
tionship progressively established with water: inhab-
ited at first as a refuge, it becomes a resource later on. 
Finally, the third and last point has to do with the sense 
of belonging: in both cases, they are an heterogeneous 
group made of several ethnic groups who entered into 
contact at successive periods. 
HISTORICAL NARRATIVE AND THE BUILDING 
OF THE TOFFINU AND THE LEBU FOUNDING MYTHS
The Toffinu are called «Water people». /To/ means 
a body of water, /fin/ expresses the action of stealing, 
taking away, or monopolizing and /nu/ designates 
whom does it belong to. Toffinu literally means «people 
monopolized by water» (Bourgoignie, 1972). They fled 
from the Danhomey razzias and chose the marshlands 
as a refuge to settle down. Afterwards, they spread all 
along the shores of Lake Nokoué, of the Zou Valley and 
of Porto-Novo Lagoon. Some of them migrated towards 
Badagri (nowadays Nigeria), in the vicinity of Lagos 
Lagoon, in search for waters richer in fish, at the time 
fishing went down in Nokoué. In the sixties, the pop-
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8. According to Pru-
dencio (1969), Afoto-
nou means «on water 
where feet cannot 
step anymore».
ulations once called Toffinu coast people, left the old 
lake villages of Awansouri and Afotonou8, respective-
ly destroyed in 1910 and 1923. However, the Toffinu 
kingdom also includes lands not flooded all year round 
or not flooded for long periods of the year. The histo-
ry of the Toffinu plants its roots into the past of the 
city of Tado. Like all other peoples from South Benin, 
they consider this town as their original cradle. Three 
brothers, Gangbo, Hunsu, and Ejè, from the Ajawa 
clan had to leave Tado and made a stop at Adja-Hon-
hué which means «refuge home for Adja fugitives». 
This place is situated to the West of Lake Ahémé, some 
kilometers South of Bopa, almost facing the village of 
Dodomè (nowadays Tokpadomè village) on the East-
ern shore of the lake, one of the stopping places of the 
Agasuvi migration (Mondjannagni, 1963). Not feeling 
completely safe, they continued roaming until they 
ended up at a marshy place which they reckoned to be 
sufficiently distant and safe. They named it Ahuansè 
which literally means «the war has ended» (Ahuan, 
war ; sè-si, to end), from where the name Ahuanso-
ri (Awansouri) derives. This was how the Ahuansori 
village was founded during the second half of the sev-
enteenth century, on the South shore of Lake Nokoué, 
next to the lands already occupied by a xwla popula-
tion from Djèken-Godomè. 
The Toffinu were tormented for more than half a 
century by repeated attacks from Goun soldiers (Dun-
glas, 1967). It was only gradually that they started to 
co-operate with the men from the different plateaus 
around them. Nowadays, this community shares these 
lands not only with the Wémènu but also with the Gun, 
37
9. This study repre-
sents for its authors 
the first contact with 
Black Africa and 
«living» sociology. 
Our interest in the 
unknown forms of 
resistance they have 
developed corres-
ponds to (and finds 
confirmation in) 
the interest these 
authors have already 
lent to this commu-
nity because of its 
fighting back external 
influences. They have 
studied their reac-
tions to the contact 
with Islam and with 
two important urban 
centers, Dakar and 
Rusfique. Nowadays 
the Lebu interest us 
because the terri-
tories of certain 
villages, such as Yoff 
or old Ouakam, resist 
to the absorption by 
the Dakar urban area, 
and their penc are 
key elements of their 
social and spatial 
organization.
10. For a detailed 
presentation of the 
different myths and 
legends, we refer to 
Mercier and Balan-
dier text (1946).
the Yoruba and the Aïzo. The village toponyms evoke 
the wars (or their end), in contrast, their names evoke 
water, in their case a synonym of restored peace, be-
cause of the shelter it provides. The connection with 
fishing is evident, though not explicit. But they contin-
ue to be, depending on the times of year, stockbreeders 
and farmers.
The Lebu would be «reclusive, particularistic, 
coherent people», as in their description by Balandier 
and Mercier (1946, p. 11) who conducted an investi-
gation within the Lebu fishermen in 1946.9 Were they 
a population of fishermen since the very beginning? 
They doubt it: 
The connection attributed to large Lebu families 
and marine creatures in different versions of their 
history allows us to date far back in time the moment 
when they learned fishing. Also,
«(…) did they already have this character before se-
ttling down in Cap-Vert and Petite Côte? Legends offer 
some contradiction on this matter. One of them, appa-
rently more recent, is about a fish-woman, captured by 
a brave, sea fishing pioneer who, once brought in among 
men, would have taught them the fishing techniques and 
religious practices, and would have united with them. 
A legend that tends to attribute to a marine inheritan-
ce the qualities of the Lebu fishermen.» (idem: p. 17)10
«Traditions speak about their relationship with the Tyuba-
lo, fishermen native from the river (...). These Tyubalo are 
Toucouleur elements, not a people but a caste of fishermen. 
They would have been the masters of the Lebu in the art 
of fishing. (…) This way, the Lebu would have made their 
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Where do they come from? If the last stages of 
their migrations can be clearly identified, their an-
cient past raises numerous uncertainties. The Lebu 
are described by Cheikh Anta Diop (1967, p. 271) as 
«hordes of Barbarians who swept across the coasts of 
Africa » and were forced to flee towards the West into 
present Libya - of which they would come to be the 
founders - by the Egyptians of the Nineteenth Dynasty 
at the time of the Indo-European invasions in the sec-
ond millennium,11. This «wild country» they occupied 
was called rebu, and lebu would be one variant thereof. 
C. A. Diop tells us further down that «the main concern 
of these hordes (…) was hunting» (idem). In fact, he 
drew very eloquent correspondences between Egyp-
tian and Wolof languages, in particular /reb/ means 
«hunting », « hunter » or « to hunt » and /rebu/ indicates 
the «place where to hunt» or the «hunting country». 
The word lébu would mean «challenge, warrior», lubu 
«aggressive warrior». This etymology is contradicted 
by another version, also accepted by the Lebu: their 
name could derive from lebe «to tell, to tell a tale», in 
apprenticeship as fishermen on the banks of the Senegal 
river. Fishing practice in these regions must date back to 
a very remote period: the remnants of fishing engines, col-
lected from the middle of the Sahara and used during the 
pre-desert age, can prove it. Would the Lebu be linked to 
these populations of archaic fishermen? Has the name Lebu 
always designated a population of identical composition? 
(…) The Lebu are Wolof, the Lebu are Sérère, the Lebu are 
Sossé (Mandinka)». These different answers, given full of 
confidence by the Lebu themselves and by their neighbors, 
«would suffice to prove the mixture in their present popula-
tion.» (idem, p. 18-19) 
11. Sylla (1992, p. 
7 ff) states that the 
Lebu would have 
come from India and 
would have spent 
some time in Ara-
bia before reaching 
the Mediterranean 
coasts. He also draws 
striking comparisons 
between Dravidian 
and Wolof languages. 
The similarities are 
surprising.
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the sense of «cunning», they would be then those who 
conceal their thoughts. 
The Lebu settlement on Cap-Vert peninsula would 
be the result of migration flows coming from Eastern 
Africa between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
or could have stemmed from the displacements of 
Black populations occupying present Mauritania from 
where they were progressively chased out between 
the tenth and thirteenth centuries. In any event, not 
enduring any sort of domination, they went through 
numerous displacements and, after a rebellion in the 
eighteenth century, they were able to found a Repub-
lic, the first one to have contact with Europeans. They 
were recognized by the Cayor authorities, other inhab-
itants of the peninsula, and by those on Gorée Island 
(French settlers) before the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury. From then on, the notion of Republic reflects a 
unity feeling around the Lebu identity. Being a mixed 
group, it could have disintegrated when in contact with 
the European populations. But all the sources agree in 
the definition of their tenacious character, which will 
rebel against any form of colonization (be it religious, 
cultural, economic, political…).
These two case studies prove once again that it is 
not only possible but also necessary to revisit history, 
to adjust our look thereon, to «reconsider the Grand 
Narrative of the development of Western civilization, 
a triumphant celebration of the achievements accom-
plished by the West» (Burke 1998, cited by Goody 
2006). This cultural superiority of Europe, of West-
ern eyes who imposed their reading on the rest of the 
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world, has neglected these groups who are hardly ever 
mentioned in the official written history transmitted 
in handbooks. Presented as ‘marginals’ and ‘minori-
ties’, their destiny would be doomed to disappear. If the 
history of the human settlements in these territories 
was to be rewritten, they would have a relevant place. 
According to the European-centered vision, whenever 
they are «given value», this happens within the frame 
of tourist circuits offering ‘experienced’ visitors a de-
tour  «tradition», facing large urban conglomerations 
associated to the image of the Western metropoles or, 
in particular, to other models from China, from Dubai...
This journey back to the past of the Toffinu and 
Lebu opens line of thought which will be further devel-
oped shortly: the one dealing with the spatial solutions 
adopted, which could derive directly from mental rep-
resentations, namely their past of warriors, provides 
us with the information about forms and modes of re-
sistance set up because of the new water environment; 
the other dealing with practices which also cannot be 
explained, without knowledge of the past. In Toffinu 
environment, for example, the ancient connection to 
land is restored at the end of life when, at the time 
of the burial, the choice is systematically to bury the 
dead on dry land.
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Although with variable visibility, the politically 
correct (PC) increasingly occupies our everyday life, 
being used in various, more or less, formalised con-
texts of interaction between individuals. In normal 
circumstances of collective life, the politically incor-
rect (PI) is less and less accepted, and to successfully 
navigate in the complex world of social interaction – 
for example, in the labyrinthic field of codes associated 
with work relations – requires a reasonable command 
of the rules adhering to the PC norm. In certain “sen-
sitive” contexts, the predominance of the PC position 
reveals all its splendour. We are referring to particu-
larly delicate situations in which the PI is tolerated 
because it is PI to reprimand the use of PI language. 
In particular circumstances, a child, a disabled person 
or someone belonging to an ethnic, religious or cultur-
al minority is allowed to use language conforming less 
to the procedures imposed by the PC. As long as the 
informal, as well as the formal, rules of PC are correct-
ly followed, it is irrelevant to know whether the con-
tent of our thoughts is adequate or, on the contrary, 
opposed to the way our actions are perceived. To be 
accused of hypocrisy or cynicism regarding PC only 
happens when the cleavage between our actions and 
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our thoughts is manifested in the former. One of the 
most common forms of hypocrisy associated with the 
PC discourse comes from the paternalism expressed 
through a manifestly exaggerated approach. The abili-
ty and autonomy of a subject or group of subjects can be 
brought into question by the overzealous way in which 
we follow the rules of political correctness. In that 
case, the PC becomes a tool to express PI thoughts. In 
this context, therefore, there is no room to make vis-
ible the contradiction between what is said and what 
is done; there is only the possibility of contradicting 
what is said by the way it is said. In other words, what 
is done is what is said.      
*
The PC discourse aims to avoid offending individ-
uals belonging to the more vulnerable layers of soci-
ety. One of the most common criticisms made to the 
PC is that it restricts people’s ability to express them-
selves in a society that aspires to be free, rendering it 
as a kind of dictatorship of the offended against the re-
maining members. Bearing in mind that political cor-
rectness works by anticipating a potential offence, in 
order to avoid it beforehand, we can say that the “dic-
tatorship of the offended” unfolds retroactively, from a 
position situated in a future to escape, i.e., it positions 
itself from the point of view of the potential offended 
(who should not be offended). However, this gesture 
Political correctness: the avoidance of forms of ex-
pression or action that are perceived to exclude, margin-
alize, or insult groups of people who are socially disadvan-
taged or discriminated against. 
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of anticipation tells us that we can only conceive the 
retroactive position of the offended through the corre-
sponding projective position of the potential offender. 
For the offence not to take place, a potential offender 
is enough – one that, through the preventive gesture, 
identifies a possible offended susceptible of being of-
fended by a certain potential offence. Therefore, the 
dictatorship of the offended originates in the anticipa-
tory self-positioning of the potential offender, follow-
ing a logic as virtual as it is circular. The offended, in 
turn, is caught in the net of the offence to be avoided 
and has little room to find another position outside 
this circle: either she was not offended because the 
mechanism of anticipation and prevention worked ef-
fectively (although not escaping from the stigma of the 
virtual offence); or she took offence for the opposite 
reasons. There is, in fact, a small subversion allowed to 
the offended: to not be offended by the offence directed 
at her. But this narrow opening of freedom will always 
be dependent on the dominant position of the potential 
offender. Regardless of the numerous constraints this 
circularity may bring to the potential offender, it gives 
access to a discursive territory that belongs to him. It 
is up to the person with the power to speak to identify 
his interlocutor as potentially offended, i.e. as someone 
particularly vulnerable, and prevent the offence from 
being directed at her. Whether the offence took place 
or not, the offended is invariably integrated within a 
social group perceived by the majority of potential of-
fenders as being particularly vulnerable. According 
to the logic underlying the PC discourse, this group is 
entitled to not being offended insofar as it is deprived 
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of a voice. Through the preventive act, the offender, 
who did not become one, is integrated, in turn, within 
the majority with access to speech. That not said that 
could have been said belongs to him alone. This way, 
he is simultaneously the emitter and addressee of the 
offence that must not take place. The prevention of the 
offence is directed, therefore, not so much at the po-
tential offended but to the fraternal community of po-
tential offenders. It functions as a cue between peers 
and, unlike what is often defended, does not aim to 
structure a more inclusive discourse. It is important 
to bear in mind that the community of potential offend-
ers does not need to be physically present in a certain 
discursive situation; what matters is that, even when 
absent, it makes itself present. More than the numeri-
cal criterion, what defines the majority is precisely its 
ability to be present, even when absent. In the limits 
established between potential offender and offended, 
the PC discourse draws a territory of access and visi-
bility regarding speech. Strictly speaking, the preven-
tive gesture does not take us to the virtual plane of 
the possible – what can but should not be said – but to 
the actual manifestation of what was not said through 
what is said. Within the PC logic, it is not enough to an-
ticipate and prevent the occurrence of the offence; it is 
essential, through the use of manifestly non-offensive 
language, to make that preventive gesture perceptible 
to the remaining potential offenders. The PC mecha-
nism strives, as it were, to make that absence visible.     
*
Therefore, the PC discourse implies the identifi-
cation of groups in society that, according to the of-
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fender, are more exposed to acts of discrimination and 
prejudice. Without a particular target, the PC position 
lacks direction and intentionality. In its relation to the 
offence that will not come, political correctness situ-
ates itself between two sociocultural phenomena that 
are not extraneous to it. On one side, it can be seen 
merely as a particular variant, perhaps an intensified 
form, of politeness cemented among members of a so-
ciety that strives to be civilized and regards gratui-
tous offences unjustified. As much as PC critics stress 
its overzealous control over the use of speech, they 
are always in a weak position when their critique is 
advanced through the relativization of the content of 
the offence. The offence is always relative, and against 
a general perception among the potential offenders 
about what is offensive or not there is not much that 
can be done. On the other side, the PC discourse finds 
its limit in the growing terminological sanitation per-
vading the contemporary institutional world, from the 
state machine to labour relations management. The 
hygienization of language is expressed in multiple pro-
cesses of life management. It assumes, nonetheless, 
two distinct facets: a commercial and a bureaucratic 
dimension. On the one hand, we face a “softer” sani-
tary inclination, manifested in euphemistic processes 
of concealment of the violence intrinsic to the com-
mercialisation of everyday life, particularly in labour 
relations. In this regard, note how deregulated and low 
paid work is increasingly performed by “technicians, 
collaborators and consultants” of all sorts who, more 
often than not, carry out repetitive, menial, low-skilled 
tasks. On the other hand, we face a “strong” bureau-
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cratic sterilization of language that does not intend to 
terminologically soften a given reality, but expresses 
a position of power according to the cruel refinements 
of the world of administration. In this case, the termi-
nological arbitrariness reflects the violence resulting 
from the arbitrariness inherent in the state’s posi-
tion of maximal power, hence its typical penchant for 
strong irony, or even sadism. It is precisely such po-
sition of strength that surfaces in such type of termi-
nological dissonance. To refer to torture as “Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques” or to designate significant 
cuts in pensions “Extraordinary Solidarity Contribu-
tion” are examples of the sadistic-bureaucratic strand. 
In this manner, the PC discourse is enclosed by three 
distinct domains: underneath, and in a more diffuse 
way, by the “civic politeness” required when dealing 
with the more vulnerable groups of society; laterally, 
and in a more specific way, by the two mechanisms of 
linguistic deflection of violence that colonize our lives. 
In the latter case, political correctness is situated be-
tween the informal, but direct, concealment pertain-
ing to the usual linguistic softening of the violence of 
the commodification of everyday life, and the formal, 
but indirect, uncovering, manifest in the bureaucratic 
marking of state force. As a generic and preliminary 
hypothesis, we can consider that political correctness 
performs a double discursive operation, being posi-
tioned between the informal direct concealing and the 
formal indirect uncovering of economic-bureaucratic 
violence.
*
On a first level, the effectiveness of the PC dis-
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course results from the normative intersection betwe-
en what is said and the contextual situation (using the 
right words in the right place). Linguistic form and 
content are far from irrelevant, but are clearly insu-
fficient to clarify the stages resulting from the discur-
sive process. Furthermore, the interpretation of what 
is said requires a first, usually unconscious, reading of 
the discursive situation that, as we have seen, cannot 
be reduced to the identification of the potential offen-
ded by the potential offender. The direction and inten-
tion we attribute to the PC are, thus, the result of a 
subterranean interpretative movement that conjures 
up a situation, summoning potential offended indivi-
duals and the community of potential offenders (that 
makes itself present, even if absent). Before being a 
cause, the use of the PC speech is the effect of a num-
ber of preceding topical norms and readings. Of cour-
se, this is a generic requirement for any communicati-
ve practice, but nonetheless necessary for PC to unfold 
between the contextual reading, the manifestation of 
the prevention of the offence and its actual perception. 
In the normative position it produces regarding what 
should, or should not, be said and heard, the PC mecha-
nism establishes a practical relation with the available 
linguistic instruments, being a kind of manual on how 
to use language in particular contexts. Its robustness 
results, in this sense, from the consistency formed be-
tween norm and “use”. Insofar as it manifests a set of 
communication rules that regulate our discursive ac-
tions, the PC discourse takes the structure of a practi-
ce that acquires the predominant form of a practice of 
speech.  
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*
In what sense can we state that the PC discourse 
is primarily a practice, if we position it as a set of 
partially latent norms or rules? Is it a code of social 
conduct or its practice? A box of discursive tools or a 
pre-established set of rules? Norms and actions can be 
interdependent but they are not the same thing. When 
we suggested that the PC discourse operates as a mode 
of use of language, we should bear in mind that “mode” 
and “use” are structured by practice. There is no form 
independent of practice and practice is the main for-
malizer and formatter of the PC discursive “tool”; it is 
the agent that joins norm and action. In this regard, 
one should bear in mind that the formal deployment 
of PC terminology in the world of administration does 
not require a set of previously established rules (even 
if sometimes, and increasingly so, the right to non-of-
fence is justified and grounded according to the letter 
of the law and the Constitution). Since it is not nec-
essary to formalize the form via bureaucratic or legal 
means, it is not possible to make reference to a code 
of conduct without the manifestation, through “use”, 
of its conformation. Some norms can be inferred from 
their practice (such as, for example, the greater toler-
ance towards political incorrectness when voiced by 
a member of the target group of PC discourse) and, at 
a second stage, conclude that they gain a life of their 
own within the legal and pseudo-legalistic spheres. 
But no rules survive irrespective of their use. Practice 
produces norms that, in turn, condition practice. This 
perspective presents the PC discourse as naturally re-
sulting from the consolidation of habits and a “world 
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view” common to the society from which it stems. 
Here, we face an organic image of the relationship be-
tween mode and use that is, in effect, (re)produced 
by practice. Taking such path does not allow us to re-
duce the discursive practices associated with the PC 
to a specific mode of use of language, since the former 
are also a “mode of production” of a certain perception 
of discourse. Practice produces the surface through 
which the apparent natural and organic dimensions of 
discourse shine.    
*
The practical relationship between mode and use 
brings us to the core of a second question that should 
not be neglected: the PC discourse operates on the 
surface of perception. We had already suggested that, 
within the PC mechanism, the presence of a cleavage 
or disagreement between action and thought is not rel-
evant since its effectiveness requires the conformity 
between action and normative procedures, validated 
through the perception of third parties (potential of-
fenders). Therefore, it is meaningless to conceive the 
PC discourse in terms of action, if by action we mean 
an individual response to (external and internal) giv-
en stimuli, irrespective of their intersubjective visibili-
ty. The hypocrisy associated with political correctness 
does not only emerge when the dissonance between PC 
action and PI thought becomes visible; it emerges also 
through the fissure that can be opened between visible 
PC actions and imperceptible PI actions, that is, amid 
the visibility and opacity of what is said and done. The 
PC discourse requires the perception of others to ex-
ist but it is not completely transparent. The speaker 
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may be aware that it is acceptable to say x in context 
a, but unacceptable to say it in context b, without be-
ing able to clearly distinguish the line separating one 
situation from the other. The same individual might 
know perfectly well that it is possible to say x in a cer-
tain way (for example, in an ironic or cynical way), but 
inadmissible to say it in a different manner, without 
being able to determine the conditions that make it 
sayable or hearable. The lack of subjective perception 
and reflexivity concerning the rules of the PC is not 
only associated with variations relative to external 
circumstances or changes in performance. It is, first 
and foremost, a necessary condition for the natural 
operation of the PC discourse. When the subject is too 
aware of the procedures conditioning his speech, it be-
comes quite difficult to smoothly follow the normative 
guidelines. The uneasiness associated with becoming 
aware of a delicate situation is an inexhaustible source 
of humour precisely because, in normal circumstanc-
es, PC discursive spontaneity should prevail. On the 
other hand, the reflection about the conditions that 
delimit political correctness does not always result in 
the disclosure of its unfathomable mysteries. In this 
framework, discomfort and knowledge do not coin-
cide. Accordingly, the organic internalization of politi-
cal correctness presupposes a certain degree of invisi-
bility and structural latency so that the discourse can 
be exerted in a “natural” way, so that one acts with-
out thinking. The discomfort originated by the PC is 
usually aroused when one becomes aware that some-
thing inappropriate regarding that context was said 
or heard or when one becomes previously conscious 
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of a particularly delicate situation, where the offence 
is already present, even before any word is uttered 
(usually situations where the disadvantageous or vul-
nerable position of the potential offended is patent). 
In some cases, the degree of perception of the discur-
sive situation can be intensified but the very mecha-
nism that makes the offence possible, and avoidable, 
remains resolutely latent. For example, it is not un-
usual to recognise the potential offended and corre-
sponding offence, but we rarely aware that the offence 
directed at the offended, is addressed, as an offence to 
be avoided, to the community of potential offenders. 
Becoming aware creates obstacles to the smooth un-
folding of the PC discourse but it does not bring into 
question its underlying functioning mechanisms. We 
can place the PC within our culture if we take culture 
as the intersection of two contradictory processes: the 
cementing of actions into social customs and the spon-
taneous emergence of behavioural patterns. We all fol-
low the PC conduct because we have done it until now 
and is the natural thing to do. This is the position of PC 
“cultural naturalization”, which is no more than the 
symptomatic mark of its latency. It is essential for the 
PC discourse to appear, but only partially, as the way it 
manifests itself is precisely the means through which 
the elements of its mode of operation remain subter-
ranean. Taking into account that the visibility of the 
PC is related to its particular uses, we have to consider 
that action or, in a more consistent way, practice, is 
simultaneously a means of making it partially visible 
and partially invisible. We can claim, therefore, that 
practice informs the regime of visibility of the discur-
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sive process.
* 
Generally, the structure of the system of visibil-
ity of the PC discourse insists in the need for occul-
tation, articulating structural concealment through 
partial uncovering. Reduced to this simple scheme, it 
remains, however, abstracted from the social field. But 
even within such structural depuration, the question 
of invisibility indicates its inscription within a certain 
sociocultural territory. The image of the community of 
potential offenders that we derived from the abstract 
positions of the potential offender and the potential of-
fended signals precisely the unfolding of the internal 
structure over the slippery world of intersubjective 
interaction. In the double “social” and “structural” di-
mension, the inscription of the invisibility of the PC 
discourse direct us towards a somewhat contradicto-
ry process of concealment. On one hand, the invisibil-
ity inherent in political correctness is orchestrated 
through the perception of the action, which directs 
our attention to the avoided offence, maintaining the 
structural and functional principles of the discursive 
mechanism underground; on the other hand, it is the 
action itself that, inscribed in the imperceptible sur-
face of everyday life experience, has to support the 
appearance of occurring naturally and spontaneously. 
Occupying part of the indistinct plane of everyday life, 
political correctness is nowhere. In this way, the PC 
discourse has to be simultaneously visible at the level 
of the gesture and imperceptible as an action belong-
ing to everyday life. From the subjective viewpoint, 
the double process of invisibility is sustained by two 
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mechanisms of occupation of a specific spatial-tempo-
ral territory, forming, in this manner, a topographic 
model for the colonization of a place. Locked into spe-
cific words or terminology, and anchored in a certain 
discursive gesture, the PC discourse emerges topologi-
cally within a particular discursive situation. The pro-
cess of punctual anchorage is followed, in turn, by a 
dissolution of the gesture in the indistinct sea of the 
countless actions and experiences composing the nat-
uralized experience of everyday life, extending until it 
disappears. According to this model, it is essential that 
the PC mechanism appears delimited, fragmented and 
isolated and, at the same time, diffuse and indistinct. 
Between natural, diffuse appearance and functional 
concealing, a distinction is drawn between what is not 
visible and what is latent. In order to function, the PC 
discourse has to remain partially invisible, outside the 
reach of our consciousness, but this degree of invisibil-
ity is already a product of its internal latency, that is, of 
the mechanisms that, while remaining invisible, make 
it operative. Through the “topographic” and subjective 
model of the regime of visibility, we approach a thesis 
dear to psychoanalysis: what we do not see is not only 
due to a cognitive limitation of ours, as if marking an 
excess belonging to reality, but passively waiting for 
our conscious and reflexive unveiling; it produces a re-
ality as latent as active, which only sustains its opera-
tive power by hiding behind the curtains.    
*
In this brief text, we advance mere preliminary 
notes seeking to analyse the PC discourse as an ideo-
logical mechanism; the way it shapes a certain prac-
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tice and how that practice produces a system of visibil-
ity. As an ideological phenomenon, its function has yet 
to be clarified. Above, we situated the operative reach 
of the PC discourse between a double discursive deflec-
tion: the bureaucratic and market driven distortion 
of the violence that permeates our everyday life. This 
is a good starting point, since it allows us to delineate 
an area of convergence between the potential offend-
ed and the actual subject to violence. To convert the 
actual sufferer of violence into the target of a verbal 
offence therefore seems to be the first ideological func-
tion of political correctness. Through this transforma-
tion, which is generated at the level of perception, we 
place ourselves within a perverse circularity where 
the vulnerability of the “more vulnerable” groups of 
society does not result from uneven power relations, 
based on coercion and exploitation, but is seen as a 
consequence of the verbal externalization of an incor-
rect subjective and cultural identification, based on 
stereotype and prejudice. For the circular movement 
between the vulnerability of the minority and the prej-
udice of the majority to be closed, the conversion of 
the subjected to violence into the subjected to offence 
has to tend towards the reduction of the former to the 
latter. Inside such ideological field, members belonging 
to particularly vulnerable groups, such as women or 
black people, are essentially victims of prejudice. Here, 
discrimination is not a consequence of antagonistic re-
lations between classes or social groups, but the result 
of a distorted representation based on preconceived 
ideas. The movement of reduction goes from preju-
dice as a cause to offence as an effect. Accordingly, the 
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dominant class is transformed into a diffuse majority 
defined as the social group that perceives poorly and 
hastily. When its protocol is not properly observed, the 
operation of reduction performed by the PC discourse 
becomes particularly patent. In such cases where the 
PI emerges, the offender is “naturally” taken as the 
subject of violence since the verbal offence of racist or 
sexist content is automatically attributed to the racist 
or sexist. Here, is not possible to see a chance of re-
demption for the offender or to consider racism or sex-
ism outside the frame of the offence. The mechanism of 
reduction makes the offence the irrefutable evidence 
of the prejudiced character of the offender and, more 
importantly, demonstrates the beautiful nature of 
those who know how to say the right words to the right 
people. According to such circular logic, the racist or 
sexist is the one who offends. Conversely, there is no 
racism without a racist offence, nor a patriarchal soci-
ety without a sexist offence. Following a certain theo-
retical tradition, the twofold mechanism of conversion 
and reduction is called fetishism. The double articula-
tion of PC fetishism makes us reformulate the economy 
established between everyday (omni)presence (natu-
ralization and invisibility) and topological manifesta-
tion (linkage and vanishing). Through the double pro-
cess of conversion and reduction, the PC discourse is 
not partially invisible because it is present everywhere 
or because it is manifested within a certain discursive 
situation, but because it takes the part for the whole. 
In other words, the cultural naturalization of political 
correctness does not imply its diffuse extension across 
our everyday life, but the fixation of certain discursive 
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phenomena that, when inscribed within a given situa-
tion, occupy a predominant position in our everyday 
life. Hence the importance of terminology within the 
PC discourse, linking discursive “good practice” to the 
correct use of the right term for a given situation. The 
term performs here the role of condensation point, 
that is, of fetish. In a sense, the ideological efficacy of 
the PC depends more on the invisible occupation of a 
given discursive space than on its illusory character 
(conversion of violence into offence). Doing away with 
class antagonisms and relations of violence performed 
at the level of linguistic content plays a crucial role, 
but it is of little worth if that exclusion does not also 
occur through the domination of the space where that 
content is voiced. Ideology follows the maxim “if you 
repeat a lie often enough, it becomes the truth”, be-
cause its “truth” is forged in the space occupied by re-
petitive utterance. What is more, the assaults aimed at 
the PC discourse prove its predominant position with-
in a given discursive space. The most common criti-
cisms made to the PC, usually coming from the liberal 
right, accuse the guardians of political correctness of 
being a kind of “language police” (usually belonging 
to the liberal left), that seriously hinders freedom of 
expression. No matter how pertinent this debate is, it 
boils down to the right to offend or not to be offend-
ed within liberal societies, excluding the possibility of 
considering a subject of violence beyond the subject of 
the offence. The premises of the debates around polit-
ical correctness are, from the start, informed by the 
territory occupied by the PC discourse within the pub-
lic space. In this sense, they are an instrument for its 
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reproduction. Likewise, we should not consider politi-
cal incorrectness as opposed to political correctness, 
but as a deviation from the norm that keeps it alive. 
Thus, the occupation of a discursive space does not re-
sult from the slow, natural cementing of acquired hab-
its, small rituals and ways of interacting; it requires 
persistent and active reiteration, which cannot be car-
ried out without a whole material apparatus of circu-
lation, dissemination and resonance, that is, without a 
full media and communication machine that produces, 
reproduces and amplifies it. Therefore, the topograph-
ic model mentioned before to does not function solely 
within the subjective field, since it is enveloped by a 
material, objective apparatus that ultimately gives it 
a body and a soul. 
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pensamiento filosófico en España (2002), 
in collaboration with Miguel A. Ramos; La 
inflexión posmoderna: los márgenes de la 
modernidad (2004); James Casebere and 
Belleza de otro mundo. Apuntes sobre al-
gunas poéticas del inmovilismo (2005); 
Paisaje fotográfico. Entre Dios y la foto-
grafía (2007); Ser y no ser. Figuras en el 
dominio de lo espectral (2014); Las horas 
bellas. Escritos sobre cine and Negro teatro 
de Jorge Molder (2015). Literary editor of 
the books Mitos de fin de siglo (2000) and 
Estéticas de la Animación (2009). Co-di-
rector of the documentary film Pessoa/Lis-
boa (2016).
ARTHUR VIDO. Arthur Vido has been work-
ing for ten years on environmental histo-
ry, including the history of African rice. 
In recent years, he has opened his field of 
study on women and sexuality. Currently a 
teacher at the University of Abomey-Calavi 
in Benin, he is the author of several publi-
cations.
EDUARDA NEVES. PhD in Philosophy,As-
sistant Professor at ESAP (www.esap.pt). 
She teaches, since 1987, on Aesthetics in 
the fields of Visual and Performing Arts. 
Principal Investigator of the Art and Criti-
cal Studies Research Group, Arnaldo Araú-
jo Research Centre, Oporto. (www.ceaa.
pt). Research Areas: Philosophy and Aes-
thetics; Criticism and Contemporary Art; 
Art, Politics and Power; Art and Subjecti-
vation Modes. Presented several national 
and international communications. Some 
of her papers and books can be accessed 
at https://esap-porto.academia.edu/Eduar-
daNeves. 
Curator of the projects A Few Reasons for a 
Non Dismissive Art 
[http://pdgartes.weebly.com/das-plast-v-
pjs.html-2014],
Correspondences 
[http://correspondencias.weebly.com/-
2016-17]. Preselected for the Bienal In-
ternacional de Arte Contemporáneo de 
América Del Sur, Buenos Aires, with the 
curatorial project HORS-SERIE.and Hors-
Série [2017]. [https://www.facebook.com/
profile.php?id=100011446524503]
ERNESTO NETO. Brazilian artist. His work 
was exhibited at the Venice, São Paulo, 
Sydney, Havana, Mercosur and Istanbul 
biennials, the Milan, Tokyo and Tilburg 
Triennials and in the context of institu-
tions such as MoMA, Pompidou, Reína So-
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– Video screening Greetings Cards form 
Reality”, Quartier 21, Viena, Österreich; 
“Region 0. The Latino Video Art Festival 
of New York”. King Juan Carlos I of Spain 
Center at NYU, New York, USA; “Colección: 
adquisiciones e incorporaciones recientes”, 
Centro Galego de Arte Contemporánea, 
Santiago de Compostela, España; “Colecção 
de Serralves: Obras Recentes”, Museu de 
Serralves, Porto, Portugal.
MONICA CORALLI. Architect-Urban plan-
ner und PhD in Geography-Space planning, 
Monica CORALLI works since about ten 
years on urban transformations. Her re-
searches are concern with the main french 
speacking african urban area and the for-
eign-born urban models. Researcher at the 
UMR 7218 LAVUE / CNRS (Laboratoire Ar-
chitecture/Anthropologie) and Lecturer in 
Cultural heritage at Gaston Berger Univer-
sity (Saint-Louis, Senegal), Monica Coralli 
is also independent consultant. She worked 
both on property issues, urban issues and 
housing policy and preserving heritage.
NUNO FALEIRO RODRIGUES. Nuno Rod-
rigues is an Associate Professor at ESAP 
(Escola Superior Artística do Porto), Por-
tugal, where he teaches art theory on the 
Post-graduate course on Contemporary 
Art and studio based project in the Ba on 
Visual Arts and Photography. He is a mem-
ber of the Arnaldo Araújo Research Centre, 
Portugal, and  member of its Art Critical 
Studies Research Group. Recently, he has 
participated in the internatonal projects 
Assemblies: Acts of Social Urgency and Im-
agination and Media in the Expanded Field. 
Nuno Faleiro Rodrigues has published sev-
eral articles and essays on modern and 
fia Museum, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo 
Modern Art Museums, Guggenheim Bilbao, 
Kunsthalle Viena, Kölnischer Kunstverein, 
Wiener Secession, Tinguely Museum, Lon-
don and Boston ICA, CCB, IVAM, MEIAC, 
Dundee Contemporary Arts, Musée des 
Beaux-arts de Nantes, Walker Art Center, 
Garage Museum of Contemporary Art - 
Moscow, Tokyo Museum of Contemporary 
Art, The Drawing Center, Hélio Oiticica Art 
Center, Sydney Museum of Contemporary 
Art, Fundament Foundation and the Yvon 
Lambert, Elba Benítez, Hayward, Serpen-
tine, Fortes Vilaça or Artur Fidalgo gal-
leries. He is represented in the collections 
of the Museum Boijmans van Beuningen, 
SFOMA, MCA – Los Angeles, The American 
Fund for the Tate Gallery Collection, Thys-
sen-Bornemisza, La Caixa and Televisa 
Foundations, Stockholm Konsthall, Daros 
Latin America, Purchase Fund or the 21st 
Century Museum of Contemporary Art, 
among other institutions.
FERNANDO JOSÉ PEREIRA. Artist, PhD in 
Fine Arts, Assistant Professor at FBAUP. 
Research Areas: Art and Politics; Art and 
Nature – as politics; Art and technology. 
Presented several national and interna-
tional communications as in the Sympo-
sium on Arctic Cinema 2016, Trondheim, 
Norway; Art as Technology symposium, 
Helsinki, Finland; and publications as in 
the journal of Utopian Studies. 
Recent exhibitions: Qalandyia Interna-
tional, Open Gallery, “Fear”, Palestinian 
Art Court, East Jerusalem, Palestine; “La 
gran maquina”, Museu Trepat de Tàrrega, 
Catalunya, España; “The 10th Berlin Inter-
national Directors Lounge [DLX]”, Berlin, 
Deutschland; “Post Colonial Flagship Store 
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contemporary visual culture. He is particu-
larly interested in the relationship between 
art, politics, representation and ideology.
ARTISTS
AMARANTE ABRAMOVICI. Filmmaker 
graduated from La Femis, Paris. Degree 
from Paris University III, Sorbonne. Select-
ed for the Cannes Film Festival – Cinéfon-
dation section, with Gaia (2004) and for 
Cinema du Réel, with Circa Me (2002). Di-
rected films in collaboration, such as A Cul-
tura do Capital (2003) or Travelling 70’-
76’ (2007) and also the video-installation 
A Colher (2010). Between 2005 and 2013 
she collaborated with Serralves Museum. 
PhD student with FCT scholarship for re-
search on cinema produced during the por-
tuguese revolution. 
JOÃO VASCO PAIVA. Master in Fine Arts, 
School of Creative Media, City University 
of Hong Kong. Degree in Fine Arts, ESAP. 
Exhibited in several institutions, among 
which: Artsonje Center, Seoul; Witte de 
With, Rotterdam; Independent Cura-
tors, New York; Saatchi Gallery, London; 
C.o.C.A., Torun; Sharjah Art Foundation, 
UAE; Ullens Center of Contemporary Art, 
Beijing; MAC Lyon; Videospace, Budapest; 
Garage CCC, Moscow; SESC S. Paulo; Hong 
Kong Museum of Art. Oriente Foundation 
(2006-08) and Calouste Gulbenkian Foun-
dation scholarships (2012). 
MARIA COVADONGA BARREIRO. Phd in 
Visual Arts, Vigo University. Exhibited 
at Fundación Gonzalo Torrente Ballest-
er; CCAI, Gijón; CAJ, Madrid; Casaborne, 
Málaga; Galería Atlántica, A Coruña; 
Galería Metro, Vigo; Galería Sargadelos, 
Pontevedra; Museu Univ. Alicante, at Lat-
inarte, Madrid and at Muestra de jóvenes 
artistas europeos, org. A.I.C.A. - Asoci-
ación Internacional de Críticos de Arte. 
Diputación de Ourense Fine Arts Prize, 
2008; Artists’Scholarship, Diputación de 
Pontevedra, 2010. Art and Critical Studies 
researcher at CEAA and teacher at ESAP, 
both in Oporto. 
SÉRGIO LEITÃO. PhD and Advanced Visual 
Arts Program (FBAP/UVIGO); Degree in 
Fine Arts (ESAP); Independent Visual 
Arts Program (MAUMAUS). Sculpture / 
Photography (AR.CO) and Video (CAM_
CALOUSTE GULBENKIAN FOUNDATION) 
programs. Projects: Gasthof, Frankfurt, 
org. ICA, Moscow; Protoacademy, Edin-
burgh; Städelschule, Frankfurt; Kulturni 
Centar, Belgrade; Landproject, Chiang Mai; 
Manifesta, Amsterdam; Go to Frisco, org. 
Southern Exposure, San Francisco; NoD-
Roxy Gallery, Prague; EB, Frankfurt; Cent 
Quatre / Jacobs, Paris; Projetto Minasi, Mi-
lan; ZDB Gallery, Lisbon, among other in-
stitutions. Selected for the portuguese rep-
resentation of the CPLP biennial. 
TÂNIA DINIS. Master’s Degree in Con-
temporary Artistic Practices, FBAUP. She 
presented her projects in Portugal, Spain, 
United Kingdom, USA, Brazil, Mexico, Ar-
gentina and Austrália. She collaborated in 
several film projects.  Her work was award-
ed at the Chicago Experimental Film and 
Vídeo Festival, Curitiba Internacional 
Festival, São Paulo Super 8 Festival, Ibe-
rian Expression Film and Photography 
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Festival. International Prize and Audience 
Award at the Dresdner Schmalfilmtage. 
She was part of the feature films jury at the 
17th Luso-Brazilian Film Festival.
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